DILEMMAS There is no blueprint for postconflict development. The situation differs too much from country to country. But there are a number of recurrent dilemmas. Decision makers cannot copy measures taken elsewhere, but they can get inspired by the ways in which similar dilemmas have been handled in other conflict-torn societies. Such dilemmas come to the fore in every chapter of the book. A number of them are listed below. We invite you to respond to them with suggestions for possible solutions, resources, and insights. You can do so on this website under your reactions. How to deal with warlords: Too much time, according to Salomons, is often wasted in trying to probe for the underlying motives and ideology of spoilers who have only one thing in mind: exerting power and plundering their environment. But powerful warlords and criminals cannot be ignored either. How can they be integrated, isolated, marginalised or expulsed? How democratic should the democratisation process be? How much authority should be granted to non-elected local officials in the immediate aftermath of conflict? Herrero is in favour of the Kosovar model (no authority), which is different from what is applied in Afghanistan and Iraq. Herrero writes that granting authority to non-elected locals risks alienating the population. But this certainly applies to third-party rule as well. Relationship between new and old power structures: Traditional leaders and structures are stronger and enjoy more support than new ones, even if the new leaders are democratically elected. Who should be supported? If an integration of traditional and new institutions is the goal, how should this be done? International or local judges? There are few judges left in a country after protracted civil conflict. Many were highly partisan, many were killed, others emigrated. The remaining judges may not meet the highest professional standards. But international judges often have little legitimacy and little knowledge of local customs and circumstances. So who should be responsible for the “rule of law” in post-conflict societies? Infrastructure development: Infrastructure projects should be prepared with a broad participation from the public. But how to prevent that community participation in decision-making about infrastructure paralyses the process – in a situation of great time pressure to create the basis for renewed economic development? Impact of free media on conflict: Free media play a crucial role in the process of democratic decision-making. But they depend on commercial success. They have to serve their customers – and in that way can perpetuate rather than change pre-existing opinions and perceptions. Are activities designed to stimulate a change of attitudes towards the conflicting parties in contradiction with the idea of independent and neutral media? Language policy: Local languages should not be suppressed and children should be able to get at least primary education in their mother tongue. But this can work to the detriment of national unity (if there is no common medium of communication) and can distribute life chances in an uneven way. Length of NGO presence: International NGOs can make a tremendous effort to improve the health situation of a population in an emergency situation. But their continuous presence can have a negative influence on government efforts to build up a health system. Should NGOs leave the country even if the population is not yet sufficiently provided with medical services? Environmental concerns: The environment is not a priority in conflict situations, - and not in post-conflict situations either. But environmental problems may belong to the root causes of a conflict. When will they have to be addressed and become a priority? Carriers of economic development: Somebody has to invest in economic development. The international community will only finance basic infrastructure. Foreign investors can hardly be attracted to conflict regions. The only domestic sources of capital are often groups with a dubious past. How much of economic development can be left to such groups? Public Finance: Revenues need to be raised while at the same time avoiding as much as possible taxes and user charges that bear disproportionately on poorer groups. These are the groups that are the least mobile; others can more easily hide or transfer their income. Revenue reforms that threaten elite interests may falter. Where will taxes to finance development come from? Donor assistance: Where should the money go? The most ‘backward’ areas are often controlled by warlords. Does not dealing with these warlords mean further damaging these areas? Choice of cooperation partners: The choice to work with particular actors and to by-pass others is crucial. Should external agents choose to work with government agents, groups from civil society or political parties (or a combination of them)? Working with government agencies may slow down and reduce the effectiveness of a programme. But cooperation with civil society or individual political parties only can contribute to a further fragmentation of the country. Entrenchment of democratic minimalism: Forms of political power sharing between conflicting parties can stop violence, but may block further political development, because quota may have to be maintained irrespective of political performance and cooperation. Democratic participation of the population is thus threatened to become a farce. Dealing with undemocratic rulers: A similar dilemma as in the case of interaction with warlords is posed when the government itself is not democratic. How to deal with a situation as in Cambodia, where the present ruler guarantees a minimum of stability, but himself came to power in an all but democratic way? Support for him does not do justice to his role in the conflict, but agitation against him could make things worse.