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RESEARCH AGENDA From the texts in this book an ambitious research agenda can be distilled. It is not formulated as a series of open questions, but the statements below can be read as hypotheses. It is not an agenda for the traditional kind of academic research, either desk research or field research. It is more an agenda for action research - or an agenda for experimental action with some accompanying research to establish in how far the action really leads to the intended consequences.
1. The international dimension of internal conflicts: Current large-scale violent conflicts are mostly internal, not international conflicts. But that does not mean that they do not have an important international dimension. Without a whole network of arms suppliers, diamond traders, drug dealers, traffickers, money suppliers, the violence would not reach the same scale. In some fields, international measures have been taken or are under discussion to curb this international support and stimulation of internal conflicts. The Kimberley process (to control the export of diamonds from conflict areas) is a good example. The question is which additional measures can be taken to tackle other international links beside the diamond trade. A lot is to be done to curb the international trade in arms. Disarmament as actually practiced often is a trade incentive for weapon dealers who are supplied with additional arms as a result of disarmament elsewhere (if the arms are sold abroad and not destructed) and who face additional demand where disarmed belligerents try to replenish their arsenals or even to obtain additional cheap weapons to be turned in, if the incentive offered by the disarmament programme is strong enough. Another field of activity could be the interaction with migrants. They often adhere to a “long distance nationalism” which is more radical than the one shared by people who stayed in the country. They do not have to compromise or to suffer the consequences of hard-line action, because they live far away. Their influence therefore often has a polarizing effect. But perhaps this influence could also be turned around. It can be easier to involve them in a positive interaction with people from the other side, rather than to apply such programmes to the conflicting parties in the conflict area itself. If members of the various diasporas reach a better understanding between representatives of different groups, they might exercise a moderating influence on the fighting parties. International associations of all kinds could make a more conscious effort to involve people from the different conflicting parties in common activities. It is often the confrontation with third parties from other countries and cultures that makes it obvious that the internal differences are relatively small after all, and that there is a lot of common ground. Cooperation in international associations also helps to establish common standards that could then also be applied at home. To top 2. The self-perpetuation of the aid economy: Most post-conflict societies are highly dependent on foreign aid. This is a kind of income that is similar to the income from raw material exports, - in the sense that nobody (or only a tiny group of people) has to work for it. People quickly develop a kind of dependency syndrome. The very fact that many projects come to an end once the aid flow stops is a clear indication that these flows do not always stimulate local initiative, but nail recipients down in a dependent role. The impact of the large number of staff from foreign aid agencies that tend to swamp a conflict region after violence stops needs to be better understood. Actually, the focus is often on better evaluations of the projects with the objective to end and avoid projects that do not achieve their objectives. The suggested emphasis here is different. The question raised here is what the long-term consequences, side-effects and externalities are of projects that are run well and do achieve their primary goals. Even those projects may have consequences that may give rise to second thoughts. This impact cannot be evaluated at the project level only. It is the massive cumulative impact of a large number of projects by many different organisations that can become a problem on its own (irrespective from the useful outcome of the individual projects). The presence of large numbers of expatriates has far-reaching consequences for trade flows, employment patterns, wage structures, and exchange rates. Even excellent work of international agencies can have a negative impact on the nascent local structures, which may not unfold because of their comparative inefficiency, distrust of (part of) the population, and a lack of pressure to improve these services. The large-scale presence of foreigners has also an important impact on the attitudes of people in the country itself (and in the country where the expatriates come from). Devoted humanitarian work, disregarding all differences in ethnicity, class or gender, could set a good example. Vanessa van Schoor mentions in her contribution that medical assistance has endangered the lives of patients and healthcare workers working in zones of the other ethnic group, but their courage and the model they present, may be a first step in reconciliation. But the very consumption habits, spending patterns, expensive equipment, etc., of such workers can also have a quite different impact, where it stimulates theft, illegal taxation (often in kind) and extortion. The work of the agencies can also have an important impact back home. The personal reports to friends, family and colleagues on the local situation and on the fighting parties can have a stronger impact on perceptions than the published news. More research has to be done on alternatives to the present form of international help which, in the worst case, implies that hordes of aid workers descend upon a local population like an ancient plague. Often the expatriates replace the group of well-educated local people that left the country as a reaction to the violence (if they were not killed). Programmes to bring them back could create a more sustainable situation. It would also make sense to bring in local people from neighbouring countries that have gone through similar processes in their own society. Their experience could be more adequate, their manners might be less foreign, their salaries might be more in line with those of the local population, and their expenditures less conspicuous. To top 3. The de-criminalisation of state and economy: The main reason for the large-scale presence of foreigners is often that locals are regarded to be not knowledgeable enough, inefficient, partisan, or corrupt. The absorption of almost all existing structures (including churches, NGOs, justice…) into criminal networks during a long period of protracted conflict goes much further than is usually acknowledged. We still need a better understanding of how these structures work, - and even more urgently how they can be dismantled, transformed, or at least sidelined. It is also difficult to find actors that can actively pursue such a policy, since practically all institutions are affected by it. Some cooperation between international organisations (like Transparency International), local public and private organisations and the media might be desirable. Successful examples should get much more public attention. Strong state institutions are necessary to cope with criminal organisations. This increases the pressure to explore raw material deposits for additional government income. But such a development makes the state also more vulnerable for the assault by groups that want to share in this income. To top 4. From a rent-seeking to a productive economy: An enormous challenge is how to get from a rent-seeking to a productive economy, which may be a basic condition for a switch to a democratic society. A rent-seeking economy has much more far-reaching consequences than is often recognised: the general level of education can be much lower – with all the implications that that entails (a lack of emancipation, high population growth rates, the easy manipulation of information, bad sanitary conditions, weak civil society). The health situation of the general population is relatively irrelevant to the flows of income to the government, because the income is not derived from work. The informal economy and the criminal circuits reveal that there is a lot of creativity in the population, which - when given greater space, encouragement and support - could provide a broad range of unexpected developments. A good general education is the precondition for harnessing the creativity, - to learn about the state of the art, about experiments elsewhere, to exchange information with others, to integrate in international networks, and to fully participate in a “worldwide information society”. To top 5. Establishing a working democracy: The World Bank has concluded that “there has been no comprehensive analysis of public sector reform and capacity building in post-conflict settings – this is urgently needed” (World Bank 2004, 33). The “exit-strategy” of international organisations is normally focused on the organisation of free elections, after which the government could be handed over to the elected officials. But a one-time democratic election does not guarantee that a democratic system takes roots. Much more is necessary, - from changes in the educational system and the growth of independent, critical media and a lively civil society, to more participatory structures in factories and bureaucracies, different attitudes towards minorities, and less authoritarian family structures. The shift towards a real democracy implies nothing less than a cultural revolution in many countries. Such a shift does not take place over night. Even the most democratic societies still have some way to go. The question is how such a process can get sustained support from the outside, without imposing any specific model. In many countries, historical structures do exist which can serve as an example. (Sen 1999, 232-240) Just as specific ethnic identities and interpretations have been evoked recently to support the struggle between ethnic groups, a “rediscovery” of the other half of history is of paramount importance, - of the history of good neighbourhood, of tolerance, and of common goals and challenges. Another issue that relates to the success of establishing a working democracy is the much-publicised “resource curse”. Under which conditions can the negative societal effects of large incomes from raw material exports be mitigated? How can a shift from a rent-seeking economy to a productive economy be realized? Under which circumstances is democracy compatible with an economy based on rent-seeking? To top 6. Changes in Identity: Identities are regarded as something relatively constant, - something that people are born with (like colour) or have acquired very early (mother tongue) and will not change much thereafter. But we have seen that many identities have been profoundly redefined during the last two decades. Ethnicity or nationality has become much more important for a number of reasons (reaction to globalisation, decline of ideologies, increasing social polarisation). Troublesome as this shift is, it also offers some hope for the future: Ethnic identities are not a fixed given, - they change over time (sometimes quite quickly), they are malleable. Everybody fulfils many different roles in life. These can all become more or less important in the perception of “self” and in the definition of identities. The question then is how a new shift away from ethnicity as basic element of identity can be stimulated. Much more research is necessary on historical redefinitions of identities and on the factors that have supported, accelerated or obstructed such a process. People of different age have a different susceptibility to changes in identity. Children acquire a specific identity at an early age, but this is open again at the end of adolescence. Young adults have anew to find their place in society. Some of the present troubles in many countries of the world is that they offer so few prospects for income, well-being and status to the millions of adolescents and young adults. Millions of young people find themselves on a labour market,- where few jobs are on offer. This is especially frustrating for youths who sacrifice their education for the struggle for a political cause, and then remain idle because of a lack of formal education. This lack of attractive perspectives for young adults is an important factor underlying many violent conflicts. This increases the chance that these groups will centre their identity around ethnicity due to the lack of professional identities, class identity, identification with the team they or organisation in which they work or identification with their product. To top 7. A new role in the international division of labour: The individual perspectives are intimately connected to finding a role in the international division of labour. The international position of a country largely determines which kinds of jobs and professions are in demand (and what kind of identities can be formed around them). Just to copy international examples of cheap manufacturing work is probably no solution. In most cases, it would be difficult to match the conditions offered in Southeast-Asia. So, instead, a lot of creativity and intelligence is demanded to come up with something new. A pioneering status in well-published social experiments of all kinds (environmental projects, water management, micro-credits, education, transport, etc.) can provide the participants and their communities with a new identification, a social asset they can be proud of, international attention, the integration into international networks of a new kind, and sources of income. To top 8. The slow learning of international organisations: International agencies are adapting to the new challenges. A good example is the LICUS programme of the World Bank. There is a wealth of experience in these institutions, but most of them are still experimenting with ways to pass the knowledge and insight on within their own organisation and to find ways of sharing knowledge between organisations . As Dirk Salomons remarks in his contribution: “There is an impressive body of policy recommendations and lessons learned. Yet, many practitioners in the field of post-conflict recovery are concerned that these cumulative insights have not led to a more informed and harmonised international response activity.” What could be done to assure that the lessons learned are really taken into account? What are the incentives to learn, and what are the obstacles that prevent learning processes? There are strong contradictory pressures on the staff of international aid agencies. On the one hand, they have to work as efficiently as possible (which means to apply standard procedures and recipes, to concentrate on large-scale projects, and to keep in mind all kinds of environmental, gender, and other implications), on the other hands they have to adapt to local circumstances, take political constellations into account, assure quick help and response in a flexible way, give local staff a larger role, and show a more experimental attitude. Much of the help is still focused on the immediate tasks, without much thought for the design of a decades-long social change strategy, and on the technical aspects of a political transition, at the cost of attention for the social, economic, and psychological processes of transformation (e.g. on the logistics of separating and disarming troops vs. how to address trauma, guilt, mourning and identity and how to reintegrate them into society; on financing aid and economic development vs. how to address unemployment and development). Here a cultural change is necessary in the agencies as well, starting from the educational background of the staff, the selection mechanism, the terms of employment and career patterns, evaluation procedures and payment structures. How can this be changed? To top 9. Post-conflict development as conflict prevention: The best predictor of future conflict is conflict in the recent past. Manifest violence is not only an indicator of a strong conflict potential that remains in place, even when large scale violence has come to a (temporary) end, violence also creates and intensifies a conflict potential, - by stimulating hatred, causing trauma, feelings of revenge, and feelings of senselessness, by destroying the means for survival and intensifying competition for the remaining scarce resources (such as access to international aid). Without an economic development that provides a new basis for earning income, increasing welfare, reasonable progress and life-chances for the next generation, relatively evenly distributed over different groups of the population, chances are high that new conflicts will break out. Longitudinal analyses should study in detail how the conflict potential is built up, how conflicts perpetuate themselves, and which kind of development can reduce the conflict potential for the future. For tax-payers and donor organisations, it would be much cheaper to help strengthen those structures that work in favour of peace, rather than shoulder the cost of very expensive operations after a conflict has started. Everybody agrees on the importance of conflict prevention, but relatively little is done. The obstacles that stay in the way of conflict prevention need a closer analysis, - combined with a thorough reflection of how the obstacles can be overcome. |